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Abstract
We propose parallel and distributed algorithms for the housing allocation problem. In this
problem, there is a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a strict preference list for
a subset of houses. We need to find a matching for agents to houses such that some criterion
is optimized. One such criterion which has attracted much attention is Pareto Optimality. A
matching is Pareto optimal if no coalition of agents can be strictly better off by exchanging
houses among themselves. We also study the housing market problem, a variant of the housing
allocation problem, where each agent initially owns a house. In addition to Pareto optimality,
we are also interested in finding the core of a housing market. A matching is in the core if there
is no coalition of agents that can be better off by breaking away from other agents and switching
houses only among themselves in the initial allocation.
In the first part of this work, we show that computing a Pareto optimal matching of a house
allocation is in CC and computing the core of a housing market is CC-hard, where CC is the
class of problems logspace reducible to the comparator circuit value problem. Given a matching
of agents to houses, we show that verifying whether it is Pareto optimal is in NC. We also
show that verifying whether it is in the core can be done in NC. We then give an algorithm to
show that computing a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching for the housing allocation
problem is in RNC2 and quasi-NC2.
In the second part of this work, we present a distributed version of the top trading cycle
algorithm for finding the core of a housing market. To that end, we first present two algorithms for
finding all the disjoint cycles in a functional graph. The first algorithm is a Las Vegas algorithm
which terminates in O(log l) rounds with high probability, where l is the length of the longest
cycle. The second algorithm is a deterministic algorithm which terminates in O(log∗ n log l)
rounds, where n is the number of nodes in the graph. Both algorithms work in the synchronous
distributed model and use messages of size O(logn). By applying these two algorithms for finding
cycles in a functional graph, we give the distributed top trading cycle algorithm which terminates
in O(n) rounds and requires O(n2) messages.
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1 Introduction
Matching is a fundamental problem in computer science with numerous applications. The
housing allocation problem [10, 22, 1] is an instance of matching problem with one-sided
preferences. In this problem, we need to allocate a set H of houses among a set A of
agents and monetary compensations are not allowed. Each agent ai ∈ A ranks in order of
preference a subset of H (the acceptable houses for ai). The variant in which there is an
initial endowment of houses to agents is known as the housing market problem [19, 18, 17].
For both the housing market and the housing allocation problem, we need to construct a
matching of agents to houses such that it is optimal with respect to some criterion. One
criterion usually considered is Pareto Optimality [1, 3, 19]. A matchingM is Pareto optimal
if there is no other matching M ′ such that no agent strictly prefer M to M ′, and at least
one agent strictly prefer M ′ to M . For example, a matching M is not Pareto optimal if a
group of agents could improve by exchanging the houses that they are assigned to in M .
Possible applications of the housing allocation problem and the housing market problem
include: assigning virtual machines to servers in cloud computers, allocating graduates to
trainee positions, professors to offices, and students to roommates. Yuan [21] also describes
a large-scale application of housing allocation in the allocation of families to government-
subsidized housing in China. Also, the paper [13] describes applications of algorithms for the
stable marriage problem for mapping clients to server clusters in a content delivery network
in Akamai. When only one side preference is considered, housing allocation algorithms can
be applied.
For the housing allocation problem, there is a simple greedy algorithm, known as the
serial dictatorship mechanism [1] to compute a Pareto optimal matching. The serial dic-
tatorship mechanism works as follows. Arbitrate a total ordering on all the agents. Let all
agents pick their top choice of the remaining houses one by one following the total order.
This algorithm is sequential and takes O(n2) computation steps. Also, it does not necessarily
give a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching. The paper [3] studies the problem of
finding a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching for the housing allocation problem
in the sequential setting. Their algorithm first computes a maximum cardinality matching
of the bipartite graph formed by agents and houses and then improves the matching to be
Pareto optimal. Their algorithm runs in O(
√
nm) sequential time, where n is the number of
agents plus the number of houses, and m is the number of edges of the agent-house bipartite
graph. They also show that any improvement to the complexity of their algorithm would
imply an improved algorithm for finding a maximum matching in a bipartite graph.
For the housing market problem, Shapley and Scarf [19] prove that there exists at least
one matching in the core of any housing market and present the well-known top trading
cycle (TTC) mechanism, which they attribute to David Gale. This mechanism works by
repeatedly finding the top preference cycles and exchanging houses along those cycles. It
takes O(n2) sequential steps. Ma [12] shows that the TTC mechanism is the only individually
rational, Pareto-efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism. Roth and Postlewaite [18] show
that there is exactly one core for each housing market instance. Note that the matching
obtained by the TTC mechanism is not only a Pareto optimal maching, but also the unique
core.
The parallel complexity of both these problems has not been studied in the literature.
The housing allocation problem is a variant of the stable marriage problem with only one
sided preferences. The decision version of the stable marriage problem, i.e, given a pair of
man and woman, to decide whether they are matched in the man-optimal stable matching,
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is CC-complete [14]. The CC class [14] is the set of problems logspace reducible to the
comparator circuit value problem. Currently, there are no efficient parallel algorithms for
this class of problems. It is conjectured that CC is incomparable with NC [6, 14], the class
of problems computable in polylog parallel time. In this work, we show that finding the
core of a housing market is CC-hard, which can be taken as evidence that this problem
is not parallelizable. Although finding the core is hard, we show that given a matching, it
can be verified in NC whether it is the core. On the other hand, finding a Pareto optimal
matching is easier than finding the core. We show that finding a maximum cardinality
Pareto optimal matching can be done in RNC2 and quasi-NC2, where RNC2 represents
the problems which have uniform circuits of polynomial size and O(log2 n) depth and quasi-
NC2 represents the problems which have uniform circuits of quasi-polynomial size nO(logn)
, and O(log2 n) depth.
In this paper, we also study the housing market problem in the distributed setting. Spe-
cifically, we give a symmetric distributed algorithm for the TTC mechanism. By symmetric,
we mean that each agent performs the same role.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
We prove that computing the core of a housing market is CC-hard, by giving a logspace
reduction from the lexicographically first maximal matching problem, which is a CC-
complete problem, to the housing market problem.
We show that computing a maximum cadinality Pareto optimal matching for the housing
allocation problem is in RNC2 and quasi-NC2.
We give a symmetric distributed TTC algorithm for computing the core of a housing
market, which runs in O(n) rounds and require O(n2) messages.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries for the housing alloc-
ation and the housing market problem. Section 3 studies the parallel complexity of the
housing market problem. Section 4 presents a parallel algorithm for computing a maximum
cardinality Pareto optimal matching for the housing allocation. Section 5 presents a distrib-
uted algorithm for computing the core of a housing market. Finally, section 6 present the
conclusions and future work.
2 Preliminaries
The housing allocation problem deals with assigning indivisible houses to agents who have
preferences over these houses. In general, a housing allocation instance (A,H,P ) consists of
(1) a set of agents A = {a1, a2, ..., an},
(2) a set of indivisible houses H = {h1, h2, ..., hm},
(3) a preference profile P = {≺a1 ,≺a2 , ...,≺an}, where ≺ai defines a strict preference of
agent ai on a subset of houses.
We restrict our attention to strict preference profiles where each agent defines a strict total
order over a subset of houses. Let N(i) denote the subset of acceptable houses for agent i.
The goal of the housing allocation problem is to find a Pareto optimal matching of agents
to houses. For a matching µ and an agent i, let µ(i) denotes the house matched to agent
i. We use h ≺i h′ to denote that agent i prefers house h to house h′. For two matchings µ
and ν, µ ≺i ν denotes that agent i prefer µ(i) to ν(i). The definitions of Pareto Domination
and Pareto Optimality [19] are given as below.
I Definition 1. (Pareto Domination). Suppose µ, ν are matchings. Then µ Pareto domin-
ates ν if and only if
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(1) µ i ν for all i ∈ A,
(2) µ ≺j ν for some j ∈ A.
We use µ ≺ ν to denote that matching µ Pareto dominates matching ν.
I Definition 2. (Pareto Optimality). Suppose µ is a matching. Then µ is Pareto optimal
if and only if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching ν.
The housing market problem is a variant of the housing allocation problem, where there
is an initial endowment of houses to agents and we have the same number of agents and
houses. Let µ0 be a matching denoting the initial endowment of houses to agents. Let
(A,H,P, µ0) denote an instance of a housing market. In the housing market problem, in
addition to Pareto optimality, we also want a matching to be individually rational [2] defined
as follows.
I Definition 3. (Individually Rational). Suppose µ is a matching of agents to houses in a
housing market. Then µ is individually rational if µ(a) a µ0(a) for all a ∈ A.
Individual rationality means an agent is willing to give up its initially assigned house
only when it can get a better house. To define the core of a housing market, let us first
define the concept of coalition. Informally, given a matching µ, a coalition w.r.t µ is a set of
agents A′ ∈ A such that, by only switching houses within themselves, each agent in A′ can
get a house at least as good as its house in µ and at least one agent gets a strictly better
house.
I Definition 4. (Coalition). Given a housing market (A,H,P, µ0) and a matching µ, a set
of agents A′ ⊆ A form a coalition w.r.t µ if there exists a matching ν such that
(1) ν(a) ∈ {µ0(b) | b ∈ A′}, ∀a ∈ A′
(2) ν(a) a µ(a) ∀a ∈ A′
(3) ∃ a ∈ A′ such that ν(a) ≺a µ(a)
Condition (1) says that to get matching ν from µ0, the agents in A′ only switch houses
within themselves. Condition (2) means that in matching ν each agent in A′ is matched to
a house at least as good as the house it gets matched to in µ. Condition (3) means that
at least one agent is matched to a better house in matching ν. The core [19] of a housing
market is defined as follows.
I Definition 5. (Housing Market Core). The core of a housing market problem is a set of
matchings M such that matching µ ∈M if and only if there does not exist any coalition A′
w.r.t µ.
Essentially, a matching is in the core of a housing market if there does not exist a set of
agents such that they can match to better houses by breaking away from other agents and
exchanging houses within themselves. An individually rational and Pareto optimal matching
is not necessarily a core matching, whereas a core matching must be individually rational
and Pareto optimal. An example to illustrate the difference between a core matching and
an individually rational Pareto optimal matching is given in Fig. 1.
It is easy to see that both M1 and M2 are individually rational and Pareto optimal
matchings. M2 is the core matching but M1 is not. In M1, agents a1 and a2 can form a
coalition within themselves and swap houses. Suppose a1 and a2 break away from other
agents and switch houses with each other. Then, a1 gets house h2, which is the same as the
house it gets in M1, and a2 gets house h1, which is strictly better than the house it gets in
X. Zheng and V. K. Garg 23:5
a1 : h2, h3, h1
a2 : h1, h3, h2
a3 : h1, h2, h3
Preference Profile
a1 : h1
a2 : h2
a3 : h3
Initial Endowment
a1 : h2
a2 : h3
a3 : h1
M1
a1 : h2
a2 : h1
a3 : h3
M2
Figure 1 An Example
M1. Thus, M1 is not the core. On the other hand, in M2, there does not exist two agents
such that at least one will be strictly better off by forming a coalition and swapping houses
among themselves.
The following result is well-known.
I Lemma 6 ([18]). There is exactly one unique matching in the core of a housing market
instance.
Since the core of a housing market has one unique matching, we use the core to mean this
unique matching henceforth. The TTC algorithm given by Shapley and Scarf [19] computes
the unique core of a housing market. This algorithm works in stages. At each stage, it has
the following steps:
Step 1. Construct the top choice directed graph Gt = (A,E) on the set of agents as
follows. Add an arc from agent i ∈ A to agent j ∈ A if j holds the current top house of i.
Step 2. Since each node has exactly one outgoing edge in Gt, there must be at least one
cycle, which could be a self-loop. All cycles are node disjoint. Find all the cycles in the top
trading graph and implement the trade indicated by the cycles, i.e, each agent which is in
any cycle gets its current top house.
Step 3. Remove all agents which get their current top houses and remove all houses
which are assigned to some agent from the preference list of remaining agents.
The above steps are repeated until each agent is assigned a house. At each stage, at least
one agent is assigned a final house. Thus, this algorithm takes O(n) stages in the worse case
and needs O(n2) computational steps.
3 Parallel Algorithms for Housing allocation and Housing Market
In this section, we study the parallel complexity of the housing allocation and housing
market problem. The parallel computation model we use here is the CREW PRAM model
[11]. First, we show that computing a Pareto optimal matching in a housing allocation
is CC by reducing this problem to the lexicographically first maximal matching problem
(LFMM), which is aCC-complete problem [14]. In the LFMM problem, we are given a graph
G(V,E,≺) where ≺ denotes a total ordering on the edges. If e1 ≺ e2, we say that e1 precedes
e2. The total order ≺ allows us to regard a matching M as a sequence SM = (e1, e2, ...) of
edges in ascending order, i.e, j < k =⇒ ej ≺ ek. Given two matchings M and N , we say
M ≺ N if SM lexicographically precedes SN . The relation ≺ defines a total order over all
maximal matchings. The minimum element, Mlex, of this order is call the lex-first maximal
matching of G(V,E,≺). We need to decide whether a given edge e is in the lex-first maximal
matching of the graph. Then, we show that computing the unique core of a housing market
is CC-hard, by giving a logspace reduction from the LFMM problem to the housing market
problem. We say a problem is CC-hard if every problem in CC reduces to it.
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I Theorem 7. Computing a Pareto optimal matching for a housing allocation is in CC.
Proof. We reduce the problem of computing a Pareto optimal matching to the LFMM prob-
lem. Given a housing allocation instance (A,H,P ), we construct an agent-house bipartite
graph G = (A∪H,E,≺) where ≺ denotes a total ordering of edges. There is an edge from an
agent u ∈ A to a house v ∈ H if v is acceptable to u. For each agent u, let ru : H → [|N(u)|]
denote its rank function, i.e, ru(v) denote the rank of house v at agent u’s preference list. We
assign an arbitrary unique ordering to all the agents, i.e, a one-to-one function f : A→ [n],
where n = |A|. For each edge (u, v), we associate the tuple < f(u), ru(v) > with it. We
define the total order ≺ on edges as the lexicographical ordering of the tuples associated with
them. Clearly, ≺ defines a total ordering on all edges. We claim that the lex-first maximal
matching Mlex of this graph corresponds to a Pareto optimal matching. Suppose not, then
there exists another maximal matching M ′ which dominates M . There must exist an agent
u ∈ A such that u prefers M ′(u) to M(u). We have that ru(M ′(u)) < ru(M(u)), which
means that (u,M ′(u)) ≺ (u,M(u)), contradicting the fact that M is the lex-first maximal
matching. J
I Corollary 8. There is a O˜(
√|E|) time parallel algorithm which uses O(|E|) processors to
compute a Pareto optimal matching, where is |E| is the number of acceptable agent-house
pairs.
Proof. Follows from the fact that there is a O˜(
√|E|) time parallel algorithm for the LFMM
problem [14]. J
I Corollary 9. There is a O(√n) round distributed algorithm in the congest clique model
for computing a Pareto optimal matching, where is n is the number of agents and houses.
Proof. The paper [4] gives a O(
√
n) distributed algorithm for the weighted stable marriage
problem. The LFMM problem is simply a subcase of the weighted stable marriage problem.
Thus, the same algorithm can be applied here. J
I Remark. In the housing market problem, an individual rational and Pareto optimal match-
ing must be a perfect matching of houses to agents. Thus, the reduction given in Theorem 7
cannot be applied. Instead, the problem of computing a individual rational and Pareto op-
timal matching can be reduced to the problem of lex-first perfect matching. Unfortunately,
the complexity of this problem is unknown.
In a housing market (A,H,P, µ0), the weighted agent-house bipartite graph G = (A ∪
H,E,w) is defined as follows. There is an edge between agent ai ∈ A and house hj ∈ H
if either hj = µ0(ai) or ai prefers hj to I(ai). The weight of the edge is defined as the the
rank of hj in ai’s preference list. To compute an individual rational and Pareto optimal
matching for a housing market, we first observe the following lemma from [7].
I Lemma 10 ([7]). A minimum weight perfect matching of the weighted agent-house bipartite
graph is an individual rational and Pareto optimal matching.
Proof. Let u be a minimum perfecting matching of the agent-house bipartite graph. Suppose
u is not Pareto optimal. Then there must be another perfect matching v such that v Pareto
dominates u. By the definition of Pareto domination, we can easily argue that v has smaller
weight than u, contradiction. J
Combining with the results from [9] and [16], we have the following result.
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I Theorem 11 ([7, 9, 16]). There is a RNC2 algorithm and a quasi-NC2 algorithm for
computing a individually rational and Pareto optimal matching of a housing market, which
require O(n3 ·m) and nO(logn) parallel processors, respectively.
Proof. By Lemma 10, to compute an individually rational and Pareto optimal matching,
we can find a minimum weight perfect matching of the agent-house bipartite graph. By the
results of [16] and [9], computing the minimum weight perfect matching of a bipartite graph
is in RNC2 and quasi-NC2. J
Now we show that computing the core of a housing market is CC-hard.
I Theorem 12. Computing the core of a housing market is CC-hard.
Proof. We reduce the LFMM problem to the housing market problem. Let G = (V,E,≺)
be an instance of a LFMM problem, where ≺ represents the total ordering on the edges. Let
Mlex denote the lex-first maximal matching of G. We construct an instance for the housing
market problem as follows. For each node v ∈ V , we create an agent av and a house hv. So,
we have |A| = |H| = |V |. Each agent av is initially assigned house hv. The preference list for
each agent is constructed based on the total ordering of edges in E. Note that to compute
the core of a housing market, the preference list of an agent below its initial assigned house
is irrelevant, since the core must be individually rational. So for each agent, we only need
to specify the part of the preference list above its initial assigned house. For each pair of
agents au and av, if edge (u, v) exists in graph G, then agent au prefers the house hv of
agent av to its own house hu . Otherwise, agent au prefers its own house hu to hv. In other
words, for each edge (u, v) ∈ E, agent au prefers house hv of agent av to its own house hu.
The preference list of an agent au is defined based on the order of edges incident to vertex u,
i.e, agent au prefers the house hv of agent av to the house hw of agent aw if (u, v) ≺ (u,w).
Since all edges are totally ordered, the preference list for each agent is strict. Fig. 2 shows
an example of reduction above. Clearly, the above reduction can be done in logarithmic
space.
u1
u2
v1
v2
3
2
1 4
5
LFMM Instance Housing Market Instance
av2 : hu1 , hv1 , hu2 , hv2
av1 : hu1 , hv2 , hv1 ,−
au2 : hu1 , hv2 , hu2 ,−
au1 : hu2 , hv2 , hv1 , hu1
Figure 2 Constructing a Housing Market Instance from a LFMM Instance. At stage 0, edge
(u1, u2) is added into Mlex by the greedy algorithm and vertices u1 and u2 are removed from the
graph. In the TTC algorithm, the top choice graph only has one top trading cycle formed by agent
au1 and au2 . Thus, agent au1 and au2 switch their houses and their houses are removed from the
preference list of remaining agents. At stage 1, edge (v1, v2) is added into Mlex by the greedy
algorithm. Agents av1 and av2 form a top trading cycle and switch houses with each other in the
TTC algorithm.
We claim that an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is in Mlex if and only if agent au and av switch
houses with each other in the core of the housing market instance. We say that an edge
is minimum in its neighborhood if it is smaller than all its neighboring edges. Recall that
the greedy algorithm for LFMM works as follows. Add each edge which is minimum in
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its neighborhood in the current graph into Mlex and remove all incident edges of the two
endpoints of each such edge. Repeat the above procedure until the graph is empty. Since
the greedy algorithm computes the unique lex-first maximal matching of a LFMM instance
and the TTC algorithm computes the unique core of a housing market, it suffices to show
that the TTC algorithm on the housing market instance simulates the greedy algorithm on
G.
Let Gi = (V i, Ei) denote the reduced graph at the beginning of stage i of the greedy
algorithm. G0 = G. Let Ri denote the set of edges in Ei added into Mlex by the greedy
algorithm at stage i, i.e, the set of edges which are minimum in their neighborhoods in
Gi. Let M ilex denote the set of edges in Mlex at the end of stage i. Let Git denote the top
choice graph formed by remaining agents at stage i of the TTC algorithm. We now show by
induction on stages that an edge (u, v) is added into Mlex at stage i of the greedy algorithm
iff the corresponding agents au and av switches houses at stage i of the TTC algorithm.
Base case: stage 0. Consider an edge e = (u, v) ∈ R0. In the housing market, two agents
au and av correspond to this edge. Since e is the minimum in its neighborhood, agent au
and agent av are the top choice of each other. Thus, they form a top trading cycle of length
2 in G0t and switch houses with each other in the TTC algorithm. Therefore, all edges in
R0 correspond to the top trading cycles in G0t .
Induction case: assume the claim holds for stage i. Consider stage i+1 of both algorithms.
At the end of stage i, in the greedy algorithm, all edges incident to edges in Ri are removed
from the graph. In the TTC algorithm, all houses involved in the top trading cycles are
removed from the preference list of remaining agents. We claim for each edge e = (u, v) ∈
Ri+1, the two corresponding agents au and av in the housing market form a top trading
cycle of length 2 in Gi+1t . Suppose not. Let e′ = (u′, v′) ∈ Ri+1 be an edge such that agent
au′ and agent av′ do not form a top trading cycle in Gi+1t . We must have that either house
hv′ is not the top choice of agent au or house hu′ is not the top choice of agent av′ or both.
Without loss of generality, assume house hv′ is not the top choice of agent au′ . We have two
cases.
Case 1: house hv′ is not available for agent au′ . Then, agent av′ participates in a certain top
trading cycle before stage i+ 1. By induction assumption, this means that there exists one
edge ev′ incident to vertex v′ which is added into Mlex at a stage before i+1, contradicting
the fact that edge (u′, v′) exists in Ei+1.
Case 2: house hv′ is available for agent au′ but is not the current top choice for au′ . Then,
there exists another agent aw′ such that agent au′ prefers the house hw′ of aw′ to the house
of agent av′ . The existence of agent aw′ indicates that it is not involved in any top trading
cycle before stage i + 1. By induction assumption, there does not exist any edge ew′ in
M ilex which is incident to vertex w′. Thus, we have (u′, w′) ∈ Ei+1. The fact that agent
au′ prefers the house of agent aw′ to the house of av′ indicates that (u′, w′) ≺ (u′, v′) which
contradicts the fact that (u′, v′) is minimum in its neighborhood.
J
Even though we do not know any NC algorithm for either computing an individual
rational and Pareto optimal matching or computing the core of a housing market, given a
matching, we can verify whether it is an individual rational and Pareto optimal matching
and whether it is the core in NC.
I Theorem 13. Given a matching µ of houses to agents in a housing market (A,H,P, µ0),
the following two tasks can be performed in NC.
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1) Verifying whether µ is individual rational and Pareto optimal. 2) Verifying whether
µ is the unique core.
Proof. 1). Given a matching µ, to check whether it is individual rational, we just need to
check whether we have µ ≺a µ0 for each agent a ∈ A. Observe that if µ is individually
rational, it must be a perfect matching. Then, to verify whether it is Pareto optimal, we
construct a directed graph G = (A,E) as follows. There is an arc < u, v > from agent u to
v if agent u prefers µ(v) to µ(u). We claim that µ is Pareto optimal iff G is cycle-free.
(⇒). Suppose G is not cycle-free. Then there exists a directed cycle in G. Since each
arc < u, v > in G represents the fact that agent u prefers the house of agent v in matching
µ. Switching houses following the cycle gives better houses for all agents in the cycle, which
gives a new matching ν and ν ≺ µ, contradiction to the fact that µ is Pareto optimal.
(⇐). Suppose that µ is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists another matching ν such
that ν ≺ µ. The difference between ν and µ is a set of disjoint cycles. Since each agent in ν
is matched to a house at least as good in µ, each such cycle must be a directed cycle in G.
Checking whether G is cycle-free can be done in NC by first computing the transitive
closure TC of G and for each vertex u, checking whether there exists a vertex v such that
TC(u, v) = 1 and TC(v, u) = 1. Thus, verifying whether a given matching is individual
rational and Pareto optimal can be done in NC.
2). Given a matching µ, to verify whether it is the core, we construct a different directed
graph G′(V ′, E′) as follows. V ′ represents the set of agents. There are two types of arcs:
solid arcs and dashed arcs. There is a solid arc from agent u to agent v if µ(u) = µ0(v), i.e,
agent u is assigned the house owned by agent v. Hence, the solid arcs represent how agents
switch houses to get matching µ from the initial matching µ0. Thus, all solid arcs form a set
of disjoint directed cycles. There is a dashed arc from agent u to agent v if µ0(v) ≺u µ(u).
We claim that µ is the core iff there is no directed cycle which contains dashed arcs in
G. We show that any directed cycle with at least one dashed arc represents a coalition,
w.r.t µ. Let C be such a cycle in G. If we switch houses following the cycle C, i.e, for each
arc < u, v > in C, agent u matches to house µ0(v). For each solid arc < u, v >∈ C, we
have µ(u) = µ0(v) by the definition of solid arc. Thus, each agent with a solid outgoing arc
matches to the same house as in µ. For each dashed arc < u, v >∈ C, we have µ0(v) ≺u µ(u),
thus each agent with a dashed outgoing arc matches to a house strictly better than its house
in µ. Thus, each directed cycle with at least one dashed edge represents a coalition of agents,
w.r.t µ. Since a matching µ is in the core iff there is no coalition with respect to µ and each
directed cycle with dashed arcs represent a coalition, we get our desired claim.
To check whether there exists a directed cycle with at least one dashed arc in G′, we
first compute the transitive closure TC ′ of G′. For each dashed arc < u, v >, check in
parallel whether TC ′(v, u) = 1. Thus verifying whether a matching is the core can be done
in NC. J
a1 a2
a3
Figure 3 To verify whether matching M1 in the example given in Fig. 1 is the core. The solid
arcs represents how agents switch houses to get matching M1. In M1, a2 prefers house h1 which is
the initial house of a1, thus there is dashed arc from a2 to a1. a1 and a2 form a coalition w.r.t M1.
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3.1 A Parallel Algorithm for Maximum Pareto Optimal Matching
In the housing allocation problem, a Pareto optimal matching does not necessarily have
maximum cardinality, i.e, with maximum number of agents matched to a house. To find a
maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching, we adapt the sequential algorithm in [3] to
be a parallel algorithm. The sequential algorithm in [3] has three steps. To ensure that the
final matching has maximum cardinality, step 1 computes a maximum cardinality matching.
After step 1, all unmatched agents are removed from consideration. At step 2, the algorithm
improves the matching obtained from step 1 to be trade-in-free. A matching M is trade-in-
free if there is no (agent,house) pair (ai, hj) such that ai is matched in M , hj is unmatched
in M , and ai prefers hj to M(ai). That is, step 2 ensures that no matched agents prefers
an unmatched house to its current matched house. After step 2, all unmatched houses are
removed from consideration, since no matched agents prefer any of those houses to their
matched houses. The final step is to improve the matching obtained from step 2 to be
Pareto optimal, which is achieved by directly applying the TTC mechanism on all matched
agents.
Our parallel algorithm, shown in Fig. 4 has only two steps. At step 1, we compute
the maximum cardinality matching, which can be reduced to compute a minimum weight
perfect matching of a new graph. Let M ′ be the maximum cardinality matching obtained
at step 1. Let A′ be the set of matched agents. After step 1, all the unmatched agents are
removed from consideration. At step 2, we improve the matching obtained from step 1 to
be Pareto optimal. In contrast to [3], we do not first make our matching trade-in-free and
then Coalition-free. Instead, we directly compute a Pareto optimal matching by computing
a minimum weight perfect matching of a graph G′ constructed as follows. We create a set of
virtual agents B′ to ensure the number of agents is equal to the number of houses. Add an
edge with weight 0 between each virtual agent and each house. For each real agent ai ∈ A′
and each house hj ∈ H, add an edge between ai and hj if hj is ai’s partner at the end of
step 1 or ai prefers hj to its partner. The weight of edge (ai, hj) is equal to the rank of hj
in ai’s preference list.
Let G′(A′ ∪ B′ ∪ H,E′, w′) be the graph constructed at Step 2. The following lemma
shows the correctness of algorithm 5.
I Lemma 14. The matching output by algorithm 5 is a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal
matching for a housing allocation.
Proof. Let M ′ be the minimum weight perfect matching of G′. Let M∗ be the matching
output by algorithm 5, which is the induced submatching ofM ′ on the set of matched agents
A′ after step 1. Step 1 ensures that M∗ is a maximum cardinality matching. It remains to
show that M∗ is Pareto optimal. Suppose for contradiction that M∗ is not Pareto optimal.
Then there exists some other matching M ′′ 6= M∗ on real agents such that M ′′ ≺ M∗. By
definition of Pareto optimality, each agent in M ′′ should be matched to a house at least as
good as the house in M∗ and at least one agent is matched to a strictly better house in M ′′.
Since M∗ is a maximum cardinality matching, M ′′ must also be a maximum cardinality
matching which matches the same set of agents as M∗. Since the weight of an edge (ai, hj)
is defined as the rank of hj at ai’s preference list, we have w′(M ′′) < w′(M∗). Since each
virtual agent has incident edges of weight 0 in G′, there exists another perfect matching
formed by edges in M ′′ and some edges incident to virtual agents such that the total weight
is smaller than M ′ , contradicting the fact that M ′ is the minimum perfect matching of
G′. J
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Find a Maximum Cardinality Pareto Optimal Matching:
Step 1:
Let G = (A ∪H,E) denote the agent-house bipartite graph.
Compute a maximum cardinality matching of G, denoted as M .
Step 2:
Let A′ denote the set of matched agents in M .
Create a set of virtual agents B′ such that |A′|+ |B′| = |H|
Let E′ denote the edge set
Add an edge with weight 0 into E′ between each agent in B′ and each house in H
forall ai ∈ A′, hj ∈ H in parallel:
if M(ai) = hj ∨M(ai) ≺ai hj .
E′ := E′ ∪ (ai, hj);
w′(ai, hj) := rank of hj in ai’s preference list
endfor
G′ = (A′ ∪B′ ∪H,E′, w′)
Compute a minimum weight perfect matching of G′, denoted as M ′
Output M∗ := {(ai, hj) ∈M ′ | ai ∈ A′}
Figure 4 Algorithm 5: Pareto Optimal Matching for housing allocation
Now, we can state our main result for the housing allocation problem.
I Theorem 15. There is a RNC2 and quasi-NC2 algorithm for finding a maximum car-
dinality Pareto optimal matching for the housing allocation problem.
Proof. By Lemma 14, the matching obtained by algorithm 5 is a maximum cardinality
Pareto optimal matching. The time complexity of algorithm 5 is dominated by the com-
plexity of a minimum weight perfect matching of a graph. By [16] and [9], this step can be
done in RNC2 and quasi-NC2. J
4 Distributed Algorithms for Housing markets
In this section, we present a symmetric distributed algorithm to implement the TTC mech-
anism in a distributed setting. We assume a distributed message passing model with n pro-
cesses, p1, . . . , pn, which form a completely connected topology. The system is synchronous,
which means that there is an upper bound on the time for a message to reach its destination.
We require that at each round, a node can only send a same message of O(logn) size to
any other node in the network. Since the graph is fully connected, this model is also known
as the congest clique model in the literature. Actually, our proposed distributed algorithm
fits in a more restricted model called the broadcast congest clique model [8], since at round
each node only sends the same message to all other nodes in the network. This model is
in contrast to the unicast congest clique model [8] which allows each node to send different
messages to different nodes in each round.
To implement the top trading cycle algorithm in a fully distributed way, we need efficient
distributed algorithms for finding the top trading cycle. Observe that the graph formed by
the top choice of each agent is a functional graph since each node has only one outgoing
edge. Hence there is only one unique cycle in each connected component of this graph.
We present two distributed algorithms for finding all the top trading cycles in a functional
graph.
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4.1 A Las Vegas Algorithm for Finding Cycles in Functional Graphs
In this section, we give a Las Vegas algorithm, shown in Fig. 5, for finding all the disjoint
cycles in a functional graph. The primary gradient of the algorithm is a pointer jumping
technique. A similar technique is used in [15, 20] to solve the list ranking problem.
Code for Pi:
active := true
succ: successor of Pi //Pi’s next active node
children: set of nodes that Pi traversed
inCycle: whether Pi is in the cycle, initially false
while active := true
Coin-flip Step:
Flip a coin, let myCoin denote the result
Let succCoin be the coin result of succ
if myCoin = head && succCoin = tail
active := false
Explore Step:
if active := true
Let succActive be the active status of succ
while succActive = false
children := children ∪ succ
Let j be the successor of succ, set succ := j
Let succActive be the active status of succ
endwhile
if succ = i /* now succ is also active /*
active := false
endwhile
Notify Step:
if succ = i
Send ("cycle") to children
On receiving ("cycle"):
inCycle := true
Send ("cycle") to all children
Figure 5 Algorithm 1: Randomized Algorithm for Finding the Cycles
In this algorithm, each node has a variable active, which is initially true. A node ter-
minates the code when active becomes false. Each node uses the variable succ to record its
current successor node, which initially is its outgoing neighbor. Our algorithm will build a
tree. The children variable denotes the current children of a node, which is essentially all
the nodes that have been its successor. The inCycle variable denotes whether a node is in
the cycle or not. The algorithm is composed of iterations and each node keeps executing
an iteration until active becomes false. Each iteration includes two steps: a Coin-flip step
and a Explore step. In the Coin-flip step, each active node flips a coin. If a node flips head
and its successor node flips tail, it becomes inactive. This step is used to reduce the active
nodes by a constant fraction. In the Explore step, each active node traverses along the path
formed by the successor pointer of all nodes and tries to update its successor pointer to be
next active node in the path. It also adds all inactive node encountered into its children set.
When such a active node is found, it checks whether such a node is actually itself, if that is
the case, a cycle is detected. After a node determines that it is in the cycle (we will show
that there is a unique such node), it broadcasts a cycle message along the tree formed by
the child relationship (Notify step). We will prove that the set of nodes in the tree rooted
at such a node and formed by the child relation is exactly the set of cycle nodes. For the
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purpose of analysis, we assume the functional graph we consider only has one component,
which also means it only has one cycle. Our algorithm works for functional graph with
multiple components, since the executions on different components are independent.
We now show that at the end of algorithm 1 each node correctly knows whether it is in
the cycle or not. Let succ[i] denote the value of succ for Pi. First, we can easily get the
following lemma from the code.
I Lemma 16. At the end of algorithm 1, there is exactly one node i which has succ[i] = i
for each disjoint cycle in the functional graph.
Proof. For node i, if succ[i] = j at some point, then there exists a directed path from node
i to node j. Let us consider a single connected component of the functional graph. For
any non-cycle node, its succ cannot be itself since it does have a directed path to itself.
Hence, it is sufficient to consider only cycle nodes. We first show there is at least one node
i with succ[i] = i. We claim that there is at least one active cycle node remaining after
the Coin-flip step of each iteration. To become inactive, a node has to flip head and its
successor has to flip tail. This implies that two consecutive active nodes cannot become
inactive simultaneously. Hence, at the end of the algorithm at least one cycle node i with
succ[i] = i. Also, it is obvious that at most one cycle node i can have succ[i] = i at the
end of the algorithm. Therefore, there is exactly one node i which has succ[i] = i for each
disjoint cycle in the functional graph. J
Let i be the node with succ[i] = i at the end of the algorithm. Let T be the tree rooted at
node i and constructed from the child relation at the end of the algorithm. Let VT denote
the set of nodes in tree T . Let C denote the set of nodes in the cycle.
I Lemma 17. C = VT
Proof. We prove C ⊆ VT and VT ⊆ C. Suppose node i runs for L iterations. Let Ar denote
the set of active cycle nodes at round r, 1 ≤ r ≤ L. To prove C ⊆ VT , we show by induction
that each node in Ar is in tree T for all r.
Base case, r = L. AL = {i}. Node i is the root of T .
Induction case: Suppose each node in Ak is in T . We need to show that each node in
Ak−1 is in T . It is sufficient to show that the nodes in Ak−1 which become inactive at round
k are in T . Since all active cycle nodes at each round still form a cycle, Ak divides Ak−1
into multiple directed paths. For any path P of form vi, vi+1, ..., vj , only the two end nodes
vi and vj are in Ak. From the code we know that node vi continues to find active nodes
along P at round k, and it stops until it reaches node vj . Thus, all nodes in path P between
vi and vj become the children of node vi. So, all nodes in path P are in T . Hence, all nodes
in Ak−1 are in T . Therefore, we have Ar is in T for any 1 ≤ r ≤ L. Since A1 is exactly the
set of cycles nodes, we have all cycles nodes are in T . Thus, C ⊆ VT .
To prove VT ⊆ C, we show that the any non cycle node is not in tree T . For any non cycle
node j, suppose j ∈ VT . Then j must be a descendant of root node i. From the algorithm
we know that the children relation is formed by next relation in the original graph. Thus,
there must be a directed path from node i to node j in the original graph. This means j
must be in the unique cycle, a contradiction. J
I Theorem 18. Algorithm 1 computes all the cycles of a functional graph G. It has round
complexity of O(log l) and message complexity of O(n log l), w.h.p, where l is the length of
the longest cycle in G.
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Proof. Since the cycle message only traverses through tree T , from Lemma 17, we know
that each cycle node receives the cycle message and each non cycle node does not receive
the cycle message.
Since the number of active nodes in any cycle reduces by a constant fraction in expect-
ation at each iteration and each iteration takes constant number of rounds, by Chernoff
bound, algorithm 1 takes O(log l) rounds w.h.p. Each round of the algorithm takes at most
O(n) messages, which results in O(n log l) messages in total. J
4.2 A Deterministic Algorithm for Finding Cycles in Functional Graphs
In this section, we present a deterministic algorithm for finding all the disjoint cycles in a
functional graph, shown in Fig. 6. This algorithm is similar to the las vegas algorithm in the
previous section, with only one key difference. We replace the Coin-flip step in algorithm
1 to the Coloring step. Observe that in algorithm 1 the primary purpose of the Coin-
flip step is to reduce the number of active nodes by a constant factor while ensuring that
any two consecutive active cycle nodes cannot become inactive at the same time. Graph
coloring techniques can also serve this purpose. Hence, we simply replace the coin-flip step
in algorithm 1 to be a Coloring step, which is an invocation of the 6-coloring algorithm due
to [5]. After the Coloring step, each node compares its color with the color of its successor.
If a node has a smaller color than its successor, it becomes inactive. Then all remaining
active nodes perform the Explore step as in algorithm 1.
Code for Pi:
/* Variables are the same as algorithm 1 */
while active := true
Coloring Step:
6-coloring of active nodes using coloring algorithm from [5]
Request the color of succ, denoted as c′
if c < c′ /* If my color is less than the color of my successor, becomes inactive
*/
active := false
Execute Explore Step of Algorithm 1
endwhile
Figure 6 Algorithm 2: Deterministic Algorithm for Finding Cycles
We can observe that after the coloring step at each iteration, the node with the largest
color remains active in each disjoint cycle. By similar argument, we can show that Lemma
16 and Lemma 17 still hold.
I Theorem 19. Algorithm 2 computes all the disjoint cycles in a functional graph and takes
O(log∗ n log l) rounds and O(n log∗ n log l) messages.
Proof. Since no more than 5 consecutive active nodes become inactive at each iteration by
the property of 6-coloring, the Explore Step still takes constant rounds. The coloring step
introduces an additional O(log∗ n) factor. Thus, algorithm 2 terminates in O(log∗ n log l)
rounds and takes O(n log∗ n log l) messages. J
4.3 Distributed Top Trading Cycle Algorithm
We now present a distributed version of the top trading cycle algorithm. As in the sequential
setting, we assume that each node knows which nodes are holding the houses in its preference
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list. Indeed, every node can broadcast its house to all. This only requires one round and
O(n2) messages.
Code for Pi:
/* Variables */
nexti: the node which holds current top
choice of Pi
assignedi: whether be assigned final house
hi: the house Pi holds
succi: successor of Pi, same as algorithm 1
prefi: mapping from a house to the node
which holds the house.
One Stage:
succi = nexti
Execute Algorithm 1 or 2 to find out
cycle nodes
if Pi in cycle
Let hj denote the house of nexti
hi := hj
assigned := true
Broadcast remove(hi) to all
if Pi has no children
Send ok to its parent
On receiving ok from all children:
if Pi is the root of the tree
Broadcast nextStage to all
else
Send ok to its parent
On receiving nextStage:
if assignedi := false
active := true
Let Topi denote the next available
top choice
nexti := prefi[Topi]
Start next stage
On receiving remove(hj) from j:
Remove hj from prefi
Figure 7 Algorithm 3: Distributed Version of Top Trading Cycle
The distributed algorithm is shown in Fig. 7. The basic idea is using the cycle finding
algorithms presented above to simulate each stage of the top trading cycle algorithm. During
a stage, all nodes first build the top choice functional graph, i.e, update their succ variable to
be the node which holds their current top choice. Then, all nodes execute algorithm 1 or 2 to
find out whether they are in a cycle or not. After that, a cycle node gets assigned its current
top choice and broadcasts a remove message which contains the assigned house to all nodes.
When node Pi receives remove messages from other nodes, it deletes the houses contained
in the messages from the preference list, i.e, from prefi. When executing algorithm 1 or 2,
nodes might terminate at different rounds. Thus, we need to coordinate the execution of
each stage. In order to achieve this, we use a convergecast step using the tree built in the
execution of algorithm 1 or 2. When a node completes broadcasting its remove message to
all, it sends a ok message to its parent in the tree if it is a leaf node in the tree. For non-leaf
nodes, they send an ok message to their parents only when they receive ok messages from
all children. For the root node, when it receives ok from all its children, which means all
nodes have updated their preference list, it broadcasts a nextStage message to all to notify
all nodes to start the next stage of the algorithm.
Since each stage of algorithm 3 simulates each iteration of the TTC mechanism. The
correctness of algorithm 3 follows from the correctness of TTC. We now look at the round
and message complexity.
I Theorem 20. Algorithm 3 computes the core of a housing market in O(n) rounds and
takes O(n2) messages.
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Proof. We just analyze the complexity of adopting the Las Vagas algorithm as a subroutine.
The complexity of the deterministic algorithm just has an additional log∗ n factor. Let li
denote the length of the cycle at stage i of algorithm 3. At stage i, both finding the
cycle and convergecast along the tree need O(log li) rounds, w.h.p. Finding the cycle takes
O(n log li) messages and convergecast takes O(li) messages. Thus, each stage takes O(log li)
randomized rounds and O(n log li) messages. Therefore, since
∑
li = n, algorithm 3 takes
O(n) rounds and O(n2) messages in the worst case. J
5 Conclusion
We conclude with two open problems. We have shown that computing a Pareto optimal
matching for a housing allocation is in CC, which yields a linear time and linear work
parallel algorithm. Computing an individual Pareto optimal matching for a housing market
seems harder. It is interesting to know the relationship between this problem and the CC
class. It is unlikely to be CC-complete, since this would imply a RNC2 and a quasi-NC2
algorithm for the CC class. We also show that computing the core of a housing market is
CC-hard by giving a logspace reduction from the LFMM problem. It is interesting to know
whether this problem is CC-complete. Or can we show that it is P-complete?
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